20 November 25 2025

THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT EXPLAINED: A DETAILED LEGAL GUIDE BY ADVOCATE ALOK KUMAR

AUTHOR: As an advocate practicing in Delhi-NCR and a graduate of Delhi University, I have spent considerable time researching and compiling this material to present the Prevention of Corruption Act in a clear, practical manner. Before you begin, take a deep breath—the content is detailed and extensive, drawn from statutory provisions, case-law understanding, and practical exposure. This write-up is purely for educational and informational purposes and should not be taken as legal advice for any specific case.

*Please note that some information may be subject to change with future amendments, and occasional inaccuracies may persist despite best efforts. Readers are advised to cross-check statutory references with the latest official sources.

AMENDMENT: The most recent major changes to India’s Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) came through the 2018 Amendment, which remains current as of 2025. The amendment broadened the definition of bribery to “undue advantage,” made giving a bribe a punishable offence (with protection if reported within 7 days under coercion), introduced corporate criminal liability, and added Section 17A, requiring prior government approval before investigating public servants—an aspect widely criticized as diluting anti-corruption efforts. It also increased punishments, added provisions for confiscation of property, criminalized influence-peddling, and mandated faster trials (aiming for 2 years). No further amendments have been enacted after 2018.

Under Section 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, a “public servant” includes anyone authorized to perform public duties, and accepting any “undue advantage”—any benefit other than legal remuneration—is treated as corruption; for example, if an officer accepts money or gifts to influence the processing of a file or the conduct of an election duty, that benefit becomes an undue advantage. The law explains three key categories: (a) persons in the service of the government, such as teachers, police, or election officers officially appointed for polling duties; (b) persons in the pay of the government, like outsourced staff whose salary or wages come from government funds, including temporary election booth assistants; and (c) persons remunerated by fees or commission for performing public duties for the government, such as doctors paid per case under a government scheme or individuals hired on a per-day honorarium for election-related tasks—each treated as a public servant while performing that responsibility.

EXAMPLE: Here is a single, clear example that includes IAS, IPS, MP, MBBS doctor, and CA, and explains the entire process from complaint to chargesheet under the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA), including who investigates: Imagine a case where an IAS officer (District Collector), an IPS officer (Superintendent of Police), a local Member of Parliament (MP), an MBBS doctor working in a government hospital, and a Chartered Accountant (CA) acting as a middleman are all involved in a corruption scheme to approve bogus hospital equipment purchases. The CA arranges bribe payments from a private company, the doctor certifies fake medical equipment needs, the IAS officer signs the procurement file, the IPS officer ensures no local inquiry interferes, and the MP exerts political pressure to get the budget released—each receiving an undue advantage. A citizen or whistleblower can file a written complaint with the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) or Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), depending on jurisdiction; for Union-level officials or MPs, the case typically goes to the CBI, while state officers may be handled by the state ACB. 

Under Section 17A PCA, the agency must obtain prior sanction from the competent authority (for example, the State Government for IAS/IPS on state cadre duties, the Lok Sabha Secretariat for the MP, and the Health Department for the doctor) before starting an investigation, unless they are caught red-handed accepting a bribe. After sanction, investigators conduct searches, seize documents, check bank records, examine procurement files, question witnesses, and track money flow—often using forensic accountants to follow the trail created by the CA. The investigating agency then arrests or interrogates the accused, collects evidence of conspiracy, misuse of office, and receipt of undue advantage, and finally prepares a chargesheet under relevant sections of the PCA and IPC (such as criminal conspiracy and cheating). The chargesheet is filed before a Special Court for corruption cases, which then decides on framing charges and starting the trial.

SECTION 3 & 4: A corruption complaint is filed alleging that a public works officer accepted an undue advantage from a contractor to approve poor-quality construction. Once the case is registered, the government uses Section 3 of the PCA to appoint a Special Judge—a Sessions-level judge designated exclusively to try corruption offences. After the investigation, when the chargesheet is filed, Section 4 gives this Special Court exclusive jurisdiction to try the corruption case as well as any related IPC offences such as conspiracy or forgery. Under Section 4, the Special Judge can take cognizance directly, meaning the case begins immediately without needing to go through a magistrate. The PCA also requires that the trial should be completed within 2 years as far as possible. If the trial cannot be completed in this period, the Special Judge may grant extensions of 6 months at a time, but each extension must include written reasons, and the total trial period cannot exceed 4 years. This structure ensures that corruption cases are handled by a dedicated court with time-bound progress to avoid unnecessary delay.

SECTION 5 & 6: Section 5 – Procedure and Powers of Special Judge gives the Special Judge wide authority to handle corruption cases efficiently. The Special Judge can take evidence in one continuous hearing as far as possible, follow a summary-type procedure when appropriate, and use the powers of a Sessions Court to summon witnesses, issue warrants, or call for documents. Section 6 – Power to Try Cases Summarily allows the Special Judge to try corruption cases in a summary manner (a faster, simplified trial) when the offence involves a punishment of not more than two years, but if the judge feels the case requires a regular trial, they can convert it back to a normal procedure.

EXAMPLE:Suppose a junior engineer in the irrigation department is caught accepting a small bribe to clear a routine water-connection file. The Anti-Corruption Bureau submits the chargesheet before the Special Judge. Under Section 5, the Special Judge directly takes cognizance, calls for the engineer’s service records, summons witnesses, examines trap officials, and conducts proceedings without needing to send the case to any lower court. Because the alleged offence carries a lower punishment, the judge—using Section 6—may choose summary trial to conclude the case quickly. The judge records simplified evidence, delivers judgment faster than in regular sessions procedure, and ensures the case does not linger unnecessarily. If at any point the judge feels the matter is too complex (for example, if the defence raises questions about procedural lapses or financial records), the judge can shift from summary trial back to the normal detailed trial process.

Sections 7, 7A, and 8 differ by who commits the offence and for what purpose. Section 7 applies when a public servant himself demands, accepts, or attempts to accept an undue advantage to do or not do an official act; Section 7A applies when any person (public servant or private individual) takes money claiming they can use personal influence to get a public servant to act corruptly; and Section 8 applies when a bribe-giver knowingly offers or gives an undue advantage to a public servant to obtain a favour. Example: A tax officer demanding ₹10,000 to reduce an assessment falls under Section 7; a middleman who takes ₹20,000 from a taxpayer saying he will “use his contacts” to influence the tax officer falls under Section 7A; and the taxpayer who pays the bribe to get the reduction commits an offence under Section 8.

Section 9 makes a commercial organisation (company, partnership, firm, association, etc.) guilty if any person associated with it—such as an employee, agent, or consultant—gives or promises an undue advantage to a public servant to obtain or retain business. Section 10 extends liability to individuals in charge of the organisation, such as directors, managers, or partners, if the offence under Section 9 happened with their consent, connivance, or neglect, meaning they either knew, allowed, or failed to prevent the corrupt act. Example: If a construction company’s agent pays a bribe to a government engineer to secure a road contract, the company is guilty under Section 9; and if the company’s managing director knew about the payment or failed to put anti-corruption safeguards in place, he can be punished under Section 10.

Under Section 11, a public servant can be punished simply for wrongfully obtaining any valuable thing without adequate consideration, even if no specific favour or bribe agreement is proved; for example, a senior IPS officer whose daughter is given a fully sponsored foreign internship by a private security company—without her applying and without the officer paying anything—can still be liable because the benefit was clearly obtained due to his official position, not merit. Similarly, a Municipal Commissioner who receives an 80% “goodwill discount” on a luxury hotel wedding booking, despite no official scheme authorizing such discounts, can be prosecuted under Section 11 because he accepted a valuable benefit arising from his status, even if there is no direct evidence he granted any favour in return.

Section 13 deals with criminal misconduct by a public servant, focusing on serious corrupt acts such as abusing official position, dishonestly misusing powers, or intentionally enriching oneself or another person through corrupt or illegal means. It covers situations where the public servant causes wrongful gain or loss to anyone, or possesses assets disproportionate to known sources of income. Example: A senior PWD engineer manipulates project estimates, approves inflated bills, and diverts materials to a private contractor in exchange for hidden payments, thereby abusing his position and causing loss to the government—this is criminal misconduct under Section 13. Second example: A district officer with a modest salary is found owning multiple luxury flats and cars far beyond his legal income, and he cannot explain the source; even without direct proof of a specific bribe, his unexplained wealth can lead to charges under Section 13(1)(b)for possessing disproportionate assets, a clear form of criminal misconduct.

Under the Prevention of Corruption Act, the normal punishment for most corruption offences—such as accepting, giving, or requesting a bribe—is generally 3 to 7 years of imprisonment, along with a fine, and in more serious cases like criminal misconduct (Section 13), the punishment can extend up to 10 years. Section 14 specifically deals with punishment for habitual offenders, meaning a public servant who has been convicted earlier under the PCA and commits another corruption offence; in such cases, the punishment becomes more severe, and the court may impose imprisonment of 5 to 10 years, along with a fine. This section is meant to strongly deter repeat or persistent corruption by public officials.

Section 17, 17A, and 18 deal with who can investigate, when investigation can begin, and how property can be attached, and they work together to regulate corruption inquiries. Section 17 says that only senior officers—like inspectors, DSP-level officers, or CBI officers of equivalent rank—can investigate PCA offences, ensuring that corruption cases are not handled by junior officers. Section 17A, added in 2018, requires prior government sanction before investigating any public servant for actions done “in discharge of official duty,” except when the person is caught red-handed taking a bribe; this provision protects honest officials but can slow investigations. Section 18 allows authorities to inspect bankers’ books and financial records, enabling investigators to check accounts, transactions, or deposits suspected to be linked to corruption.

EXAMPLE:A complaint is filed alleging that a district education officer approved fake school grants. Under Section 17, only a DSP-rank ACB officer can investigate the case. But because the officer passed the grants in his “official capacity,” the ACB must first obtain sanction under Section 17A from the state government before starting investigation. After sanction is granted, investigators suspect bribe money was deposited through a series of accounts, so they use Section 18 to examine bank statements and financial transactions to trace the illegal funds.

Sections 19, 20, and 21 deal with sanction for prosecution, legal presumptions, and protection of actions taken in good faith, and they work together during trial. Section 19 says that a public servant cannot be prosecuted in court without prior sanction from the competent authority (e.g., state government, central government, or appointing authority), ensuring no frivolous cases are filed against officials. Section 20 creates a powerful legal presumption: if it is proved that a public servant accepted or attempted to accept an undue advantage, the court will presume it was a bribe unless the accused proves otherwise—shifting the burden of proof.

EXAMPLE: A clerk in the revenue department demands ₹5,000 from a farmer to issue a land certificate. The farmer complains to the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB), which prepares a trap. The trap team applies phenolphthalein powder—a colourless chemical—to the currency notes. The complainant is instructed not to touch the notes unnecessarily and to hand them over only if the clerk demands the bribe. When the clerk takes the tainted notes and puts them into his drawer, the ACB team enters and catches him. The officers wash the clerk’s fingers in a sodium carbonate solution, which immediately turns pink, proving he handled the phenolphthalein-treated money. They also wash the drawer where the notes were kept, and if it also turns pink, it shows the bribe was accepted and stored. This scientific test—called the phenolphthalein trap test—provides strong evidence that the public servant physically received the bribe, supporting prosecution under Section 7 (accepting undue advantage) and allowing the court to apply the presumption under Section 20 that the money was a bribe unless he proves otherwise.

Sections 21 to 25 of the Prevention of Corruption Act cover protective and procedural provisions. Section 21 safeguards officials by giving protection for actions taken in good faith while enforcing the Act. Section 22 makes the Code of Criminal Procedure applicable to PCA cases, ensuring standard criminal procedures apply unless the Act provides otherwise. Section 23 empowers the government to frame rules for effectively implementing the Act. Section 24 protects complainants by ensuring that statements made by a person who reports giving a bribe under compulsion cannot be used against them. Section 25 repeals the old 1947 PCA and establishes that the 1988 Act applies in its place.

Sections 26 to 31 of the Prevention of Corruption Act deal mainly with interpretation, procedural continuity, and transitional provisions. Section 26 clarifies how certain expressions used in the Act should be interpreted by referring to their meanings in the Indian Penal Code or other laws. Section 27 ensures that the Act applies uniformly to the entire territory of India (except areas specifically exempted). Section 28 states that the provisions of the PCA operate in addition to the IPC, meaning an accused can be charged under both laws if the facts fit. Section 29 gives the Central Government the power to remove difficulties that arise while implementing the Act, usually by issuing appropriate orders. Section 30 repeals older anti-corruption laws while saving actions already taken under them, ensuring continuity. Section 31 provides the standard rule that any reference to the repealed law in existing documents should be understood as referring to the corresponding provisions of the new Act.

"WHEN CORRUPTION BECOMES CULTURE, JUSTICE BECOMES CASUALTY"

Author

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Adv. ALOK KUMAR
Advocate Serving Delhi NCR
Delhi High Court & District Courts
LL.B.▪︎Faculty of Law▪︎Delhi University


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