18 November 22 2025

UNDERSTANDING THE CENTRAL VIGILANCE COMMISSION ACT — EXPLAINED BY ADVOCATE ALOK KUMAR

AUTHOR: The Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 stands as a cornerstone of India’s statutory framework against corruption within the Union Government. For law students, a clear understanding of this legislation is essential to grasp how institutional oversight and accountability mechanisms operate at the central level. In this article, I, Advocate Alok Kumar, aim to guide you through the Act’s key provisions, institutional structure, statutory powers, and recent amendments, presenting them in a manner that is both analytically sound and accessible to learners of the law. *Please note that some information may be subject to change with future amendments, and occasional inaccuracies may persist despite best efforts. Readers are advised to cross-check statutory references with the latest official sources.

The Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, constitutes one of India’s core statutory mechanisms for combating corruption within the Union Government. To fully appreciate the functioning of this Act, students must begin with the key definitions in Section 2, which determine the scope of authority and jurisdiction. The Act defines the “Commission” as the Central Vigilance Commission itself, comprising the Central Vigilance Commissioner and Vigilance Commissioners as appointed under Section 4. It also defines terms such as the “Delhi Special Police Establishment” (DSPE) — the investigative wing later associated with the CBI — and “Government Company” as understood through the Companies Act. These definitions shape the operational boundaries of the Act, especially regarding which officials fall under the Commission’s supervisory and advisory authority. 

The CVC is empowered to conduct preliminary inquiries into complaints against public servants, including those belonging to Group B, C, and D of the Central Government, especially when referred by the Lokpal under the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013. For Group A officers, the Commission has a Directorate of Inquiry to conduct preliminary inquiries. For Group B, C, and D officials, the CVC can cause inquiries or investigations on references made by the Central Government or on complaints referred by Lokpal. The CVC does not directly register criminal cases but deals mainly with vigilance or disciplinary cases. The Commission can supervise investigations by agencies like the CBI but cannot direct the CBI to investigate in a particular manner.The Commission's jurisdiction includes inquiries into offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, for various categories of public servants. Section 3(2) clarifies an important structural element: the Commission shall consist of a Central Vigilance Commissioner as Chairperson and not more than two Vigilance Commissioners as Members, forming a three-member institution intended to balance independence with internal checks.Appointments to the Commission are governed by Section 4, which ensures both legitimacy and insulation from political influence. 

The President of India appoints the Central Vigilance Commissioner and Vigilance Commissioners based on the recommendation of a high-level committee consisting of the Prime Minister (as Chair), the Home Minister, and the Leader of the Opposition (or largest opposition group leader) in the Lok Sabha. Vacancies in this committee do not invalidate appointments, ensuring institutional continuity. Terms of service and conditions under Section 5 provide for a four-year tenure or until the incumbent reaches 65 years of age, whichever occurs earlier. Before assuming office, each appointee must take an oath of office and secrecy. They may resign by writing to the President, and their salaries are aligned with those of the UPSC Chairperson (for the CVC) and UPSC Members (for Vigilance Commissioners), and cannot be varied to their disadvantage after appointment. Removal is strictly regulated under Section 6: a Commissioner may be removed by the President only on grounds of proved misbehaviour or incapacity, and such removal requires an inquiry by the Supreme Court before action is taken. There are independent grounds too — such as insolvency, conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude, paid employment outside office, or prejudicial financial interests — where the President may remove a member without Supreme Court reference. These provisions collectively secure both independence and accountability.

Section 8 of the Act contains the substantive powers and functions of the Commission and forms the heart of its statutory role. The CVC exercises superintendence over the investigations of the DSPE/CBI in matters involving offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act or corruption-related offences concerning senior public servants under its jurisdiction. It may give written directions to DSPE to ensure timely and effective investigation. The Commission is empowered to conduct inquiries or to cause them to be conducted on references from the Central Government, as well as on complaints it receives from individuals alleging corruption. It reviews investigation progress made by the DSPE and monitors pending sanction-for-prosecution matters with competent authorities. The Commission also tenders advice to the Central Government, public sector companies, and government-controlled societies on vigilance matters and oversees vigilance administration across central institutions. These powers confer on the CVC a unique hybrid status: it is not an investigative agency but a supervisory.

Complaints received by the Commission must necessarily include the identification of the complainant. Anonymous or unverifiable complaints are discouraged because the statutory process under Section 8(1)(d) depends on the ability to assess credibility and accountability. While the Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014 provides a wider protective framework, the CVC’s practice requires complainants to disclose identity at the initial stage even if confidentiality may be maintained later. Upon receiving a complaint, the Commission may initiate a preliminary inquiry as provided under Section 8A if the case concerns Group C or Group D employees. This preliminary inquiry typically must be completed within 90 days, extendable by another 90 days for recorded reasons. After examining the preliminary findings, the Commission may decide to close the complaint, to recommend disciplinary action, or to direct a formal investigation by an agency such as the DSPE/CBI. In cases involving more serious allegations or higher-ranked officials, Section 8B enables the Commission to order a full investigation, which ordinarily must be completed within six months and may be extended to a total of twelve months. Following the investigation, the Commission may recommend prosecution, departmental proceedings, or closure of the matter. Where criminality is involved, especially under the Prevention of Corruption Act, the CVC directs the matter to DSPE/CBI or relevant police authorities, ensuring that the line between supervision and direct investigation is maintained.

Section 12 declares that the CVC is deemed to be a civil court for specific purposes and that every proceeding before it is a “judicial proceeding” for the purposes of Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (Now BNS), making the giving of false evidence or making false statements punishable offences. However, this judicial status is narrow in scope: it does not confer full contempt powers or general judicial authority, but simply ensures that deliberate falsehood or misconduct during CVC proceedings can attract applicable IPC(BNS) penalties. Section 11 grants the Commission the powers of a civil court while conducting inquiries — including summoning witnesses, enforcing attendance, examining persons on oath, requiring production of documents, and issuing commissions for document or witness examination. The Commission is supported institutionally by a Director of Inquiry, designated under Section 11A to conduct preliminary inquiries and assist the Commission with factual analysis. Financial independence is reinforced through Section 13, which provides that all expenses of the Commission, including remuneration, administrative costs, and inquiry expenses, shall be charged upon the Consolidated Fund of India, preventing the executive from undermining its functioning through budgetary constraints.

Sections 15 and 16 offer crucial protections and responsibilities. Section 15 grants immunity to the Commission, Commissioners, the Secretary, and staff for acts done in good faith under the Act, shielding them from frivolous litigation. Section 16 clarifies that all such officials are deemed to be public servants under Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code (Now BNS), thereby placing them under the obligations and standards of public accountability applicable to all public officials. Section 17 imposes an important procedural obligation: every inquiry caused or initiated by the Commission must culminate in a report which is forwarded back to the Commission. After receiving this report, the Commission reviews the findings and determines whether to recommend prosecution, disciplinary action, or closure. For example, if the DSPE/CBI conducts an inquiry into allegations of bribery against a senior Group A officer, its final inquiry report is mandatorily sent to the CVC under Section 17, enabling the Commission to decide the future course.

Section 20 provides the Central Government with authority to make rules to carry out the provisions of the Act. These rules shape the procedural framework of the Commission’s functioning, from staffing norms to inquiry procedures, and are subject to being laid before Parliament, thus ensuring democratic oversight over delegated legislation. The Act also includes a distinct framework regarding the enforcement apparatus, specifically the Directorate of Enforcement (ED). Section 25 prescribes the process for appointing officers of the Enforcement Directorate. The Director of Enforcement is appointed by the Central Government on the recommendation of a committee comprising the Central Vigilance Commissioner, the Vigilance Commissioners, and senior secretaries from relevant departments. The Director must have a minimum tenure of two years, reinforcing independence in sensitive financial crime investigations. Subsequent amendments, particularly the Central Vigilance Commission (Amendment) Act, 2021, now allow the government to extend the Director’s tenure by one year at a time up to a maximum of five years based on public interest and recorded reasons. This amendment followed litigation in the Supreme Court concerning tenure extensions, where the Court clarified that “not less than two years” signifies a minimum tenure, not a limit.

The most recent and significant amendment to the CVC Act is indeed the Amendment Act of 2021. This amendment primarily modified Section 25(d), empowering the Union Government to grant yearly extensions to the ED Director’s term up to a total of five years. The legislative intent was to ensure continuity in leadership during critical investigations, though the move has generated debate among scholars regarding executive influence and the independence of investigative agencies. Nevertheless, the amendment provides statutory clarity on tenure, which had previously been interpreted judicially rather than legislatively. In sum, the Central Vigilance Commission Act establishes an institution designed to safeguard integrity within the Central Government through a mix of supervision, inquiry powers, advisory functions, and procedural safeguards. Its structure reflects a careful balance between independence and accountability, and its recent amendments continue to shape the evolving landscape of India’s anti-corruption framework.

Author

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Adv. ALOK KUMAR
Advocate Serving Delhi NCR
Delhi High Court & District Courts
LL.B.▪︎Faculty of Law▪︎Delhi University


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